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This paper analyses the impact of asymmetric preferences with respect to
in￿ation and output by policymakers on interest-rate reaction functions. A
theoretical framework which makes it possible to identify the dominant type
of asymmetry is developed and related to the precautionary demand of pol-
icymakers for expansions and for low in￿ation. Using data for some G7
economies, the paper shows that, except for Germany, nonlinear and asym-
metric behaviour is present. A main ￿nding is that where credibility-building
and disin￿ation has already been achieved, the monetary authorities develop
a greater precautionary demand for output expansions than for low in￿ation.
T h i sm a yg e n e r a t ean e wt y p eo fi n ￿ation bias. Conversely, where credibility-
building is still a concern for the authorities, managing the business cycle is
dominated by concerns of the monetary authorities to keep in￿ation expec-
tations low.
JEL Codes: E58, E611I n t r o d u c t i o n
The 1990s have seen the emergence of an apparent consensus in monetary
policymaking. This is exempli￿ed by the fact that standard linear-quadratic
models of central bank (CB) preferences dominate discussion of monetary
policy rules1. At the same time, empirical models of central bank behav-
ior focus almost entirely on linear interest rate reaction functions, which are
derived directly from the linear-quadratic model of CB preferences2.C e n -
tral banks, on their part, actively debate the extent to which diﬀerent ways
of conducting monetary policy (individual versus collective accountability in
monetary policy councils, signalling through public statements, or the degree
of openness in publishing forecasts) help or hinder the pursuit of policy ob-
jectives3. But there is little dissent between CBs when it comes to the choice
of primary policy target (the in￿ation target has become dominant), or on
the need to stabilize both in￿ation and short-run ￿uctuations in the output
gap.
This consensus view suggests that in￿ation, on the scale of the 1970s
and early 1980s, is no longer a threat for those economies whose CBs have
adopted, implicitly or explicitly, a system of in￿ation targeting. ￿Flexible
in￿ation targeters￿ will allow some deviation of in￿ation from the target pur-
sued, in order to allow for output stabilization, but the weight given to price
stability will not allow a marked increase in in￿ation. As argued by Blinder
(1998), Vickers (1998), and McCallum (1997), independent CBs simply do
not suﬀer from the ￿in￿ation bias ￿problem identi￿ed by Kydland and Prescott
(1977) and Barro and Gordon (1983)4.
However, this view may be excessively optimistic, and to some extent
1See for example Svensson (1997), Goodhart (1999), Batini and Haldane (1999), Rude-
busch and Svensson (1999).
2See Clarida et al. (1998, 2000) Muscatelli et al. (1999), Muscatelli and Trecroci
(2000).
3This has led recently to alternative models of monetary policymaking institutions. For
instance, the Bank of England has a policy-making body (the Monetary Policy Commit-
tee) which is individually accountable and which encourages public scrutiny of individual
members. In contrast, the ECB maintains a focus on collective responsibility by its Coun-
cil. This has led to a debate on the relative merits of the diﬀerent models (see Buiter
(1999), Issing (1999) and Cukierman (2001)).
4The only problem faced by CBs is then one of uncertainty: both surrounding the
nature of shocks hitting the economy and ￿long and variable lags￿ in the transmission
mechanism (see Goodhart, 1999).
1might have been conditioned by the relatively benign in￿ation conditions
of the 1990s. Cukierman (2000, 2002) shows that the in￿ation bias may
reappear even if policymakers target the natural level of employment and
output. The problem arises whenever the CB is uncertain about the future
state of the economy and is more worried about making policy errors that
push output below than above its natural level.
What are the bases for believing that policymakers might have asymmet-
ric employment objectives? First, Blinder (1998) suggests, at least implicitly,
that the political pressures faced by the Fed not to raise the interest rate when
unemployment falls, are relatively more vigorous than pressures (if any) in
the opposite direction when unemployment increases.5 A second base relies
on the psychology of choice, and on the tendency of people to place a greater
weight on the prospect of losses than on the prospect of gains in decision
making. Kahneman and Tversky (1979, 1982, 1984) and others have high-
lighted the fact that most individuals are likely to value objective gains of a
given magnitude less than losses of the same magnitude and that this will
lead to asymmetric behavior in choices under uncertainty.
In terms of the choices facing the CB, even if the probability of pos-
itive shocks to employment equals that of negative shocks, if the CB is
loss-averse with respect to output and frames decisions in terms of possi-
ble employment losses, this will lead to asymmetric behavior with respect to
output/employment.
Of course framing of this type could also arise with respect to in￿ation.
At times of high in￿ation a CB charged with price stability is likely to attach
greater disutility to rates of in￿ation above the target than to rates of in￿ation
at a similar distance below it. Nobay and Peel (1998) and Ruge-Murcia
(2000) show that in such cases a de￿ationary bias may arise
Existing empirical evidence on asymmetric CB objectives is scant, mixed
and varied. When asymmetries are present the evidence is sometimes consis-
tent with asymmetric objectives with respect to in￿ation and in other cases
with asymmetric objectives with respect to the output gap. Dolado et al.
(2000) estimate a variant of the Clarida et al. (1998, 2000) interest-rate reac-
tion function for a number of central banks (USA, Germany, Spain, France),
allowing for diﬀerent interest-rate responses for positive and negative output
5Blinder (1998, pp.19-20) states that: ￿In most situations the CB will take far more
political heat when it tightens pre-emptively to avoid higher in￿a t i o nt h a nw h e ni te a s e s
pre-emptively to avoid higher unemployment￿.
2and in￿ation movements. They ￿nd some evidence of asymmetric CB behav-
ior with respect to the in￿ation objective, but only for the USA do they ￿nd
any asymmetry in behavior vis-￿-vis output movements. Using a Lucas type
transmission mechanism Ruge-Murcia (2001) presents time series evidence
that is consistent with the view that monetary policymakers in France and
the USA are more averse to negative than to positive output gaps. Gerlach
(2000) presents preliminary cross sectional evidence which points in a similar
direction.
Asymmetric output gap losses lead to the emergence of a precaution-
ary demand for expansions by monetary policymakers (Cukierman (2002)).
Similarly, asymmetric losses from deviations of in￿ation from target lead to
a precautionary demand for de￿ation (Nobay and Peel (1998) and Ruge-
Murcia (2000)). This paper develops a methodology for dealing with both
types of precautionary demands as an anchor for empirical work aimed at two
main objectives: 1. To test for the possible existence of asymmetries of either
kind; 2. When asymmetries are present, to determine empirically, which of
the two types of precautionary demands dominates the conduct of monetary
policy. The theoretical framework focusses on the implications of asymme-
tries in objectives for interest rate reaction functions within a New-Keynesian
framework of the type presented by Clarida, Gali and Gertler (1999). The
speci￿cation of asymmetries in objectives is rather general unlike most recent
papers on this topic.6
It is shown that both types of precautionary demands often lead to a
reaction function that is convex in expected in￿ation and that there is a sys-
tematic relation between the concavity/convexity properties of this function
with respect to the expected output gap and the dominant type of precau-
tionary demand. Thus, although it reveals the existence of some asymmetry,
an empirically estimated interest rate reaction function which is convex in
expected in￿ation does not, by itself, provide a clue for the type of asymme-
try. However the dominant type of asymmetry, and therefore of precautionary
demand, can be deduced from the curvature of the reaction function with re-
spect to the expected output gap. In particular a reaction function that is
concave in the expected output gap indicates that the precautionary demand
for expansions dominates whereas a convex reaction function indicates that
6An exception is Geraats (1999). Except for her paper that focusses on somewhat dif-
ferent issues recent work on asymmetries in monetary policy either assumes a discontinuity
at zero for the output gap (Cukierman (2000, 2002)) or speci￿es losses by means of the
Linex function (Nobay and Peel (1998) and Ruge-Murcia (2000, 2001)).
3the precautionary demand for low in￿ation dominates.
To test the theory the estimates of interest-rate reaction functions are
formulated so as to allow for the possibility of non-linear and asymmet-
ric responses in both output and in￿ation. In addition, the econometric
speci￿cation allows for a smooth transition of the slope of the function be-
tween diﬀerent ranges of the expected values of in￿ation and of the output
gap making it suﬃciently ￿exible to capture a wide range of non-linear and
asymmetric reactions.7 This methodology is applied to estimate interest rate
reaction functions for four major industrialized economies (the USA, Japan,
Germany and the UK) and to make inferences about the dominant type
of precautionary demand in each case. These economies have experienced
very diﬀerent macroeconomic conditions over the last 20 years, and have had
diﬀerent institutional frameworks governing the conduct of monetary policy.
For the time period between 1980 and 2000 the evidence points to the
existence of some asymmetry in the conduct of monetary policy in the US,
Japan and the UK, but not in Germany. The reaction function is convex in
the expected output gap in the US and the UK suggesting that the precau-
tionary demand for low in￿ation dominated the conduct of monetary policy
in those countries during this period. Reestimation over the latter period be-
tween 1985 and 2000 reveals interesting diﬀerences between the UK and the
US. It still points to the same conclusion for the UK and for Japan, but
reveals the emergence of a dominant precautionary demand for expansions
in the US whose reaction function is now concave in the expected output
gap.
Those results are consistent with the view that, after having established
its price stability credentials during the early eighties, the Fed￿s policy be-
came dominated, in the latter period, by a precautionary demand for ex-
pansions. By contrast monetary policy in the UK was dominated by the
precautionary demand for low in￿ation also during the latter period, which
is consistent with the fact that the process of in￿ation stabilization and of
reputation building in this country continued till much later This in turn
lends support to the ￿framing hypothesis￿: monetary policymakers are likely
to place greater weight on the most imminent risk of loss. At times of dis-
in￿ation, output loss becomes less important. Conversely during periods
7This contrasts with the Dolado et al. (2000) model, which only permits a discontinuous
change in slope around some ￿xed trigger point like an announced in￿ation target or an
output gap value of zero.
4which are not characterized by credibility-building and disin￿ation, asym-
metric preferences with respect to output re-emerge. These results support
the notion that reports on the ￿death of in￿ation￿ have been exaggerated.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the theoretical
framework and derives implications for the relationship between the type of
precautionary motive that dominates monetary policy and the shape of the
reaction function. Section 3 estimates a linear baseline reaction function,
tests for the existence of non linearities and then parametrizes them explic-
itly. Section 4 presents estimates of the model for the 1atter, 1985 - 2000,
period and show that the importance of asymmetric behavior varies between
diﬀerent periods (e.g. at times of disin￿ation, the output asymmetry becomes
less important). Section 5 concludes.
2 Theoretical Framework
2.1 Economic Structure
The behavior of the economy is characterized by means of a Neo Keynesian,
forward looking, sticky prices framework in which in￿ation and the output
gap depend respectively on the expected future values of those variables and
in which the policy instrument of the monetary authority is the nominal
interest rate. A simple aggregate version of such a framework has recently
been summarized compactly by Clarida et al. (1999) and is reproduced in
what follows;
xt = −ϕ(it − Etπt+1)+Etxt+1 + gt (1)
πt = λxt + βEtπt+1 + ut (2)
Here xt and πt are the output gap and in￿ation, Etxt+1 and Etπt+1 are the
expected values of those variables conditioned on the information available
in period t, it is the nominal rate of interest, gt is a demand shock, ut is
a cost shock and ϕ, λ and β are positive coeﬃcients. The expected future
output gap appears in the output gap equation to re￿ect the notion that,
since individuals smooth consumption, expectations of higher consumption
next period (associated with higher expected output) leads them to demand
more current consumption, which raises current output.
5As in stylized models of sticky staggered prices pioneered by Calvo (1983),
current in￿ation depends on future expected in￿ation. In this type of models
only a fraction of ￿rms has the opportunity to adjusts its price each period
and, due to costs of price adjustment, each ￿rm adjusts its price at discrete
intervals. Hence when it is given the chance to adjust its price the ￿rm
adjusts it by more the higher is expected future in￿ation. This interpretation
implies that β is a discount factor. The positive dependence of in￿ation on
the output gap is based on the view that this gap is a measure of excess
demand and is shared by both forward, as well as backward, looking models
of the economy in which output is demand determined.
2.2 General Speci￿cation of Asymmetric Objectives






where δ is the discount factor and Lt is given by equation (4).8
Lt = Af(xt)+h(πt − π
∗)+C(it − it−1)
2 (4)
Here A and C are positive coeﬃcients, π∗ is the in￿ation target and the
functions f(xt) and h(πt − π∗) possess the following properties.
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where the tags attached to the functions f(xt) and h(πt−π∗) designate partial
derivatives whose order is given by the number of tags. The speci￿cation in
equation (5) states that losses from both the output gap and the in￿ation gap
(the deviation of in￿ation from its target) attain their minimal levels when
8A similar speci￿cation of the loss function appears in Svensson (2000). The parameter
C measures the costs of interest rate variability. A theoretical rationale for the existence
of costs of interest rate variability appears in Cukierman (1990) or chapter 7 of Cukierman
(1992).
6those two gaps are zero and that losses are larger, at least weakly, the larger
the absolute value of the gaps. The ￿rst order partial derivatives of both
f(xt) and h(πt − π∗) are zero when gaps are zero. As with the quadratic,
the second partial derivatives are assumed to be positive, but unlike the
quadratic f(xt) and h(πt − π∗) need not be symmetric around zero.
Potential asymmetries in objectives are introduced by means of the as-
sumptions on the third partial derivatives. A negative value of f000(xt) means
that the marginal loss at a given negative output gap is larger than the
marginal loss at a positive output gap with the same absolute value. It im-
plies that policymakers have a precautionary demand for expansions. When
f000(xt)=0this precautionary demand is zero.9
A positive value of h000(πt − π∗) means that, for a given absolute value
of the deviation of in￿ation from its target, the marginal loss of a positive
deviation is larger than the marginal loss of a negative deviations. It implies
that policymakers are more averse to upward than to downward deviations
from the target. Such behavior may arise in periods of in￿ation stabilization
during which the buildup of credibility is a primary consideration. In the
particular case h000(πt − π∗)=0such aversion is absent.
2.3 The policy process and the policy rule
An important aspect of monetary policymaking is that the interest rate has
to be chosen before the realization of economic shocks is known with certainty
by policymakers. This fact is captured here by assuming that the realizations
of the shocks gt and ut are unknown at the time policymakers pick the nomi-
nal interest rate it. The policy rule can be found by minimizing the expected
value from equation (3) subject to the behavior of the economy as given by
equations (1) and (2). Inserting those equations into equation (4), substitut-
ing the resulting expression into equation (3) and taking the expected value
conditional on period￿s 0 information, the problem of the central bank is to
choose the current interest rate i0 and the sequence of future interest rates
9There is a strong analogy between the precautionary demand of policymakers for
expansions and the precautionary demand for savings by consumers. Kimball (1990) shows
that a necessary and suﬃcient condition for the existence of the latter is that the marginal
utility of consumption or income be a convex function of income (a positive third partial
derivative). Similarly, the condition −f000(xt) > 0, w h i c hi sn e c e s s a r ya n ds u ﬃcient for
the existence of a precautionary demand for expansions, means that the marginal utility,
to policymakers, of an increase in output is a convex function of output.
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[.]+C(it−it−1)−δC(it+1−it)=0 ,t =0 ,1,2,.. . (7)
This string of conditions simultaneously determines the actual interest rate
chosen in period 0 and in each of the subsequent periods as a function of
expected future in￿ations and output gaps. But only the current choice of
interest rate, i0, is currently implemented.
2.4 Comparative statics with respect to E0π1 and the
eﬀect of asymmetric objectives


































[λ(−ϕ(i0 − E0π1)+E0x1 + g0)+E0x1 + u0]. (9)
We are going to focus on the case in which the rate of time preference of
policymakers is relatively high so that δ is small.10 In this case the solution
for di0
dE0π1 from equation (8) is given approximately by
10Preliminary simulations, using a Linex speci￿cation of asymmetric preferences and
recent parameter estimates for the US, support the view that the optimal interest rate


























Since, as stated in equation (5), all the second partial derivatives are
positive this expression is positive, implying that policymakers react to an
increase in expected in￿ation by raising the nominal interest rate. If E0h
00
0 is
suﬃciently large and/or C suﬃciently small in comparison to β, the nominal
rate increases by more than the increase in in￿ationary expectations implying
that the expression in equation (10) is also larger than one. One implication
of this observation is that, if the costs of deviating from the in￿ation target
increase suﬃciently quickly with the size of the deviation (E0h
00
0 is large), an
increase in expected in￿ation induces policymakers to raise the ex ante real
rate of interest.
To evaluate the impact of asymmetric objectives on the extent to which
the response of the interest rate to a change in expected in￿ation is non
linear we now diﬀerentiate the expression in equation (10) with respect to


























where the functions￿ brackets have been deleted to simplify notation. Pro-
vided asymmetries in objectives operate with respect to both in￿ation and
the output gap E0f
000
0 < 0 and E0h
000
0 > 0 implying that the model is suﬃ-
ciently general to accommodate precautionary demands for both expansions,
as well as for in￿ation rates below the (in￿ation) target. The coeﬃcient of
E0h
000
0 is positive while the coeﬃcient of E0f
000
0 m a yb eo fe i t h e rs i g nd e p e n d -
ing on the relative magnitudes of C and of βE0h
00
0. Interestingly, if the cost
of interest rate variability as measured by C is not too large, both asymme-
tries tend to make the response of the interest rate to increased in￿ationary
discount factors. Using simulations based on estimates of the New Keynesian model from
Gali et al. (2001) for the USA, and values of the discount rate from 2%-10% (a discount
factor of 0.90-0.98) we ￿nd that setting the discount factor equal to zero only leads to
minor changes in the optimal interest rule (of the order of 10-20 basis points), and even
that only for 1-3 quarters.
9expectations higher when expected in￿ation is higher. In particular, this
may be true even if the central bank has a precautionary demand only for
expansions without any asymmetry with respect to the in￿ation objective.




0 =0and the response of the
interest rate to expected in￿ation is predicted to be linear. Thus, an interest
rate policy reaction function that is convex in expected in￿ation implies that
some type of asymmetry in objectives is present, but it does not, by itself,
provide a clue for the type of asymmetry11.
2.5 Comparative statics with respect to E0x1 and the
diﬀerential eﬀects of diﬀerent types of asymmetries






















For suﬃciently small δ
0s this can be rearranged to yield the following approx-


























The speci￿cation of the segments h(.) and f(.) of the losses from deviations
of in￿ation and output from their respective targets in equation (5) implies
that the response of the interest rate to an increase in the expected output
gap is positive. To evaluate the eﬀects of the precautionary demands for
expansion and for price stability on the form of the functional relationship
between those to variables we diﬀerentiate the expression in equation (13)
again with respect to E0x1. After some algebra the resulting expression is
11N o t e ,h o w e v e r ,t h a ti fϕ is small (as it typically tends to be in estimates of the New
Keynesian model, see Gali et al., 2001), then the asymmetry in in￿ation, E0h
000
0 tends to
















The coeﬃcients of both E0f
000
0 and of E0h
000
0 are positive. Since E0f
000
0 < 0 and
E0h
000
0 > 0 the sign of this expression is determined by the relative importance
of the precautionary demand for expansions (as measured by the absolute
value of E0f
000
0 ) and of the precautionary demand for low in￿ation as measured
by E0h
000
0 . If the ￿rst asymmetry dominates, the interest rate reaction function
should be a concave function of the expected output gap, whereas, if the
second dominates, it should be a convex function of the expected output
gap. In the absence of either type of asymmetry the reaction should be
linear in the expected output gap. Thus, the type of non-linearity in the
reaction with respect to the expected output gap can be used to ￿nd out
which type of asymmetry is stronger. Obviously, in general the results may
vary across diﬀerent countries.
3 Estimating an Interest Rate Reaction Func-
tion Model with Non-linear Responses
The major empirically testable implications of the model are: 1. In the
absence of asymmetries in objectives, the reaction function should be linear
in both expected in￿ation and the expected output gap, 2. In the presence of
asymmetries of objectives of any type the partial reaction of the interest rate
to expected in￿ation is a convex function of expected in￿ation, 12 3. In the
presence of some asymmetry, the partial reaction of the interest rate to the
expected output gap is a concave or a convex function of the expected output
gap depending on whether the asymmetry of losses from negative output gaps
is stronger or weaker than the asymmetry of losses from in￿ation rates above
the target.
To test those implications we estimate reaction functions for short-term
interest rates (the federal funds rate for the US and call money rates for
12Strictly speaking this is true provided the cost of adjusting the interest rate is not
excessively large.
11other countries) for the period13 1980-2000, using quarterly data (the data
series employed are detailed in the Data Appendix). We begin by presenting
results from the estimation of a standard linear interest reaction function
as a baseline against which to evaluate non-linear/asymmetric interest rate
reaction functions.
3.1 A Standard Linear Reaction Function
The ￿rst order condition in equation (7) specialized to period 0 implies that,
for suﬃciently small δ
0s, the current interest rate is determined by the ex-
pected future values of in￿ation, of the output gap14, and by the value of





0 =0 )the non linear terms in equations (11) and (14) are both zero
and, for estimation purposes, the reaction function can be approximated by
the following linear relation
it = α + β(E[πt,k|Ωt] − π
∗)+γE[xt,q|Ωt]+ρit−1 + υt (15)
where υt is an exogenous interest rate control error. Comparative statics of
it with respect to it−1 applied to the ￿rst order condition in equation (11)
imply that ρ is positive but smaller than one.15 Except for the fact that
the partial adjustment of the interest rate follows directly from the objective
function of the CB this speci￿cation is similar to that provided by Clarida
et al. (1998, 2000).16 Adding and subtracting βE[πt,k|Ωt] and γE[xt,q|Ωt] to
13In the case of Germany, the ECB took over control of monetary policy at the begin-
ning of EMU. Nevertheless, there is substantial casual evidence to suggest that until the
beginning of EMU in 1999, the Bundesbank continued to pursue its domestic objectives
in setting interest rates.
14As can be seen from the data Appendix, we use oﬃcial estimates of potential output
(OECD, BEA) to construct series for the output gap. In contrast, Muscatelli et al. (1999)
use a Kalman Filter based estimation to allow for gradual learning by the authorities of
changes in the processes generating in￿ation and the output gap. Using oﬃcial data on the
output gap makes our results more directly comparable to most of the existing empirical














16In that respect our speci￿cation is in the spirit of Svensson (2000) and Muscatelli et.
al. (1999) who include the costs of interest rate adjustment in the optimization exercise.
12equation (15) and rearranging
it = e α + βπt,k + γxt,q + ρit−1 + εt (16)
where e α = α−βπ∗ and the error term εt contains the forecast errors and the
interest rate control error:
εt = −[β(πt,k − E[πt,k|Ωt]) + γ(xt,q − E[xt,q|Ωt])] + υt.
To estimate equation (16) we employ Hansen￿s (1982) Generalized Method
of Moments (GMM), using as instruments four lags of the policy instrument
and of the policy targets (output and in￿ation). Clarida et al. experiment
with various leads for the output gap and expected in￿ation, but in fact
q=k=1 seems to ￿t the data reasonably well, and the estimates of the pa-
rameters are not too sensitive to changes in q and k over the range 1 to 4
quarters17.
The estimates obtained for equation (16) for all four countries, using
GMM are shown in Table 1. Four lags of the explanatory variables are used
as instruments in the estimation.
Table 1: GMM Estimates of Linear Interest Rate Reaction
Functions (Long-Run Coeﬃcients)














































Notes: Numbers in brackets indicate standard errors (using a consistent covariance
matrix for heteroscedasticity and serial correlation); σ indicates the standard error of the
estimate; J(n) is Hansen￿s test of the model￿s overidentifying restrictions. It is distributed
as a χ2(n) variate under the null hypothesis of valid overidentifying restrictions.
17The lack of sensitivity of the result to the choice of lead period is probably due to the
high degree of serial correlation in these series.
13The estimates in Table 1 are consistent with those reported in Clarida et
al, allowing for the slightly diﬀerent sample period used here. Excluding the
UK, all the countries have been characterized during the last two decades
by a long-run response of interest rates to expected in￿ation that is larger
than unity. In the case of the UK the point estimate for b β/(1 − b ρ) is close
to one, which is consistent with the fact that in￿ation was brought under
control much later. The interest rate response to the expected output gap
is not signi￿c a n ti nt h ec a s eo fG e r m a n y ,b u ti ss i g n i ￿c a n ti nt h ec a s eo fa l l
remaining countries. Note also that the UK has a higher equilibrium real
interest rate under this model than Japan, Germany and the US where it is
not signi￿cantly diﬀerent from zero. Clarida et al have used similar estimates
to support the conclusion that a number of major industrialized economies
have, de facto, followed an implicit forward-looking in￿ation targeting policy.
3.2 Evidence of non-linear or asymmetric behavior
What evidence is there that linear models of the type estimated by Clarida
et al. (1998, 2000) and reported above do not capture the full story as far as
interest rate decision-making is concerned? To provide a preliminary answer
this question we use a number of diagnostic tests. In particular we focus on
a class of residual-based tests designed to verify whether non-linear eﬀects
are present (see Granger and Terasvirta, 1993)18.
Using the ￿tted residuals from (16), one ￿ts the auxiliary model:











where xt is the vector of regressors in the original model, and ztd is a ￿transi-
tion variable￿ which may be either a lagged dependent variable (the interest
rate) or any of the variables in the model (in￿ation, output gap), or indeed
any other variable which might explain non-linear behavior in the model.
The results from applying these tests are shown in Table 2. The tests show
that in all four countries there is evidence supporting some non-linearity in
the response of the interest rate. The only exception is Germany, for which
the tests are only marginally signi￿cant, and are not signi￿cant when output
or in￿ation is used as the transition variable.
18Granger and Terasvirta stress that this form of test has power against a variety of
non-linear eﬀects, such as a logistic-smooth-transition or an exponential-smooth-transition
model.
14There are several points to note about these tests. First, we are per-
forming these tests against a variety of possible transition variables. We
will focus, in what follows, primarily on using either the output gap or the
level of in￿ation as transition variables. The reason is that the theoretical
framework implies that whether the interest rate reaction function is a con-
vex or concave function of the output gap and in￿ation carries implications
for the dominant type of asymmetry. Second, because we do not know the
true nature of the non-linear model under the alternative hypothesis (and
the appropriate transition variable(s)), the true signi￿cance level (size) of
these multiple non-linearity tests cannot be known with precision. Hence
they should be treated as indicative tests19. In other words, the statistical
test described here is a generic test which has power against diﬀerent types
of non-linear behavior.
Table 2: Tests of Non-linear Interest Rate Responses
USA H0 : δ1 = 0 H0 : δ2 = δ3 = 0
ztd = y 0.43 3.02***
ztd = π 3.52** 6.14***
ztd = it−1 3.58** 4.47***
Germany H0 : δ1 = 0 H0 : δ2 = δ3 = 0
ztd = y 1.08 1.77
ztd = π 0.98 2.08
ztd = it−1 2.37* 13.15***
Japan H0 : δ1 = 0 H0 : δ2 = δ3 = 0
ztd = y 0.28 1.05
ztd = π 17.39*** 11.19***
ztd = it−1 19.17*** 12.93***
19In general these tests are only valid when the residuals are obtained from least-squares
estimation procedures. As an alternative, we tested whether the non-linear terms were
signi￿cant when added directly to the GMM model. They were still signi￿cant. In order to
verify that the non-linearity tests are not picking up any omitted variables in the reaction
function, we also tried to add the nonlinear terms when the reaction functions also included
a lagged value of in￿ation and output. Again, the nonlinear terms were still found to be
signi￿cant. We are grateful to Adrian Pagan for suggesting these additional tests.
15UK H0 : δ1 = 0 H0 : δ2 = δ3 = 0
ztd = y 0.65 2.51**
ztd = π 1.20 3.30***
ztd = it−1 1.27 3.04***
Note: The δ1 =0test is distributed as an F(3,69) variate under the null, whilst the
δ2 = δ3 =0test is distributed as a F(6,69) variate under the null. A (*), (**), (***)
indicates that the null hypothesis of a zero restriction is rejected at respectively the 10%,
5% or 1% level.
3.3 A model of Asymmetry with Non-linear Responses
The tests in section 3.2 suggest that an alternative interest rate reaction
function to the linear one might be appropriate. A variety of diﬀerent types
of models can be constructed to capture asymmetric/non-linear interest rate
responses. In experimenting with these models, we concentrated our atten-
tion on smooth-transition models, i.e. models which predict a gradual switch
from one regime to the other. In contrast to threshold models, which predict
a sudden switch between regimes, smooth-transition regressions (STR) use
particular functional forms to specify the way in which an economy moves
from one regime to another. In our case STR appear to be preferable to
threshold models since it is unlikely that over the 20 years sample period the
switch point, or threshold, for the reaction of monetary policy has remained
unchanged as both the individuals involved in decision-making and the objec-
tives of policy have changed20 In addition, the notion of ￿framing￿ discussed
in the introduction suggests that policymakers are likely to develop subjec-
tive notions of risk vis-a-vis the in￿ation and output targets, and that these
notions of riskiness are likely to evolve gradually over time. It is unlikely
that, after passing a particular threshold for in￿ation or the output gap, CB
behavior will change in a discontinuous manner. Hence, STR models seem
as more appropriate for the analysis of non-linear and asymmetric behavior.
A smooth-transition regression (STR) model can be built following the
modelling strategy proposed in Granger and Terasvirta (1993). A version
of the reaction function in equation (16) that allows for a smooth transition
speci￿cation of non linearities is given by
20Dolado et al. (2000) partly recognize this by allowing the (unknown) switch point for
in￿ation to be determined by oﬃcial in￿ation targets.
16it = e α + β1πt,1 + γ1xt,1 + {β2πt,1 + γ2xt,1}F(zt)+ρit−1 + εt (18)
where zt is the variable which determines the transition and F(zt) is an appro-
priate non linear and continuous function of zt. Granger and Terasvirta (1993)
propose either the logistic or exponential functions to model the smooth tran-
sition (the so-called LSTR models).21 However, we obtained a better ￿tf o r
our data using a hyperbolic tangent (tanh) function to capture the gradual
transition between regimes (such a parametrization has been proposed by
Bacon and Watts (1971), and Seber and Wild (1989)). The hyperbolic tan-
gent smooth transition regression (HTSTR) assumes the following form for
F(zt):
F(zt)=δ1 tanh(ψ(zt − δ2)). (19)
The theory, as well as the tests in Table 2 suggest that the expected values of
both the output gap and in￿ation might be appropriate transition variables.
In fact, equation (18) involves a more restrictive speci￿cation than necessary
since it suggests that a single transition variable (either the output gap or
in￿ation) govern the non-linear responses with respect to both output and
in￿ation. In practice, it might be the case that both large deviations from
the in￿ation target or from the desired level of output will generate changes
in the slope of the reaction function. In order to allow for asymmetries in
both output and in￿ation to be triggered independently by transitions in both
output and in￿ation, we respecify equation (18) as follows:
it = e α + β1πt,1 + γ1xt,1 + β2πt,1Fπ(πt,1)+γ2xt,1Fx(xt,1)+ρit−1 + εt (20)
where F(.) is de￿ned in equation (19) and the subscripts π and x that are
attached to F(.) allow for the possibility that the parameters ψ,δ1 and δ2
vary depending on whether the variable which determines the transition is
the output gap or in￿ation.
21T h el o g i s t i c( L - S T R )m o d e la s s u m e s
F(zt)=
1
1+e x p ( −δ1(zt − δ2))
.
Granger and Terasvirta also consider exponential STR models (ESTAR), but these are
less appropriate for our purposes because of the form of the exponential function.
17Equation (20) has the following properties: As in￿ation varies around the
threshold δ2, the value of the hyperbolic tangent function varies between -1
and 1. Suppose for instance that δ2 =4 % ,a n dt h a tψ =1 , and δ1 =1 .A t
low in￿ation rates (approximately 2% below the threshold the tanh function
is close to its lower asymptote of -1), the long-run response of the nominal
interest rate to in￿ation is given by (β1 − β2). In contrast, at high in￿ation
rates (approximately 2% above the threshold, i.e. at 6% in￿ation, the tanh
function is close to its upper asymptote of 1), the nominal interest rate
response to expected in￿ation is given by (β1 + β2). In the interval between
these two asymptotes, the response lies somewhere in between these two
values. In Section 3.5, having estimated the model, we shall illustrate how
the response function varies over diﬀerent values of output and in￿ation using
graph plots.
3.4 Estimating a HTSTR Model
Equation (20) is estimated by GMM. As before, we use four lags of all the
explanatory variables in the estimation. Table 3 reports the estimated pa-
rameters. Equation (20) is underidenti￿ed unless we ￿xav a l u ef o rδ1.T h e
reported estimates are for δ1 =1. As far as the values of δ2 and ψ are
concerned, we conducted a grid search, as free estimation of δ2 and ψ led
to convergence problems with the non-linear optimisation algorithm. We se-
lected the value of δ2 and ψ w h i c hp r o v i d e dt h eb e s t￿t. In the case of ψ,a s
we shall see below, a value which is less than unity ensures that the functions
xt,1Fx(xt,1) and πt,1Fπ(πt,1) are convex for the range of all of our observations.
In general, we found that estimating our models setting ψ =0 .25 provided
the best ￿t22. This implies that these functions are convex for the range
(δ2 −4%,δ2 +4%), which covers 95-100% of all our observations for in￿ation
and output.
22We tried a grid search between ψ =0 .4 and ψ =0 .15.
18Table 3: GMM Estimates of Smooth-Transition non-Linear
Reaction Functions
Country Short-run Coeﬃcients Statistics Sample
Period
b e α b β1















































































































Notes: Numbers in parenthesis indicate standard errors (using a consistent covariance
matrix for heteroscedasticity and serial correlation); σ indicates the standard error of the
estimate; J(n) is Hansen￿s test of the model￿s overidentifying restrictions, which is dis-
tributed as a χ2(n) variate under the null hypothesis of valid overidentifying restrictions.
T h es t a r st h a ta r ea t t a c h e di ns o m ec a s e st ot h es h o r tr u nc o e ﬃcients mean that those
coeﬃcients are signi￿cant at the 0.05 level of signi￿cance.
19Except for Japan the best ￿t was obtained with a value of δ2 =4 %for the
in￿ation asymmetry, and δ2 =0in the case of the output gap asymmetry.
To be precise, the monetary authorities appear to be asymmetric as between
positive and negative values of the output gap, and between situations of high
in￿ation (in￿ation above 4%) and situations of low in￿ation (below 4%). In
the case of Japan during the post-1985 period the best ￿tw a so b t a i n e df o r
av a l u eo fδ2 of 2% 23. In all cases we tested whether a more parsimonious
model could be ￿tted, by testing the restrictions b β1 =b β2 and b γ1 = b γ2.I n
the case of the UK, this restriction was accepted. For the USA only the
restriction b β1 =b β2 was not rejected, for Japan only b γ1 = b γ2 was not rejected,
and in the case of Germany both restrictions were rejected.
There are several important points to note about those estimates of the
short run coeﬃcients. First, in the case of the US and the UK there are clear
signs of non-linearities as the non-linear eﬀect on in￿ation is signi￿cant in the
former case, and on both in￿ation and output in the latter case. In the case
of Japan there is a non-linear output eﬀect, but not a signi￿cant non-linear
in￿ation eﬀect. The estimated parameters on the non-linear terms in the
case of Germany are insigni￿cant. As we shall see in the next section, the
Japanese estimates show a more marked non-linearity also for the in￿ation
term if only the latter part of the sample is used (post-1985), indicating that
non-linear/asymmetric eﬀects have become more important since the mid-
1980s. In the case of Germany no improvement could be found to the above
model. This con￿rms the ￿ndings in Table 2 which show that non-linearities
do not seem to be important in the case of Germany. The Bundesbank￿s
behavior does not appear to have been subject to asymmetries, unlike that
of the Fed, the UK authorities24, and the Bank of Japan.
To illustrate the nature of the asymmetric behavior implied by these esti-
mates, we can plot the reaction function in three-dimensional space (x,π,i)
for the USA. This is shown in Figure 1, where the vertical axis shows the
long-run value of the interest rate for given combinations of the output gap
and in￿ation. Hence the asymmetric/non-linear reaction function of Table
3, which is shown as a curved plane.
Figure 1 shows that the asymmetry that seems to be present in US policy
was mainly on in￿ation. Interest rates only begin to increase more sharply as
in￿ation rises towards 4%, and below 2% the response tends to ￿atten out,
23This is probably because during this period in￿ation in Japan rarely exceeded 2-3%.
24The UK government until 1997, then the independent Bank of England.
20Figure 1: Non-Linear Reaction Functions, USA 1979-2000
suggesting that interest rates tend to reach a ￿oor. In general, the implied
response of the asymmetric model to an increase in in￿ation is less strong
than the one implied by the standard linear Clarida et al.-type model. By
contrast, there appears to be no evidence of any asymmetry on output. The
estimate of γ2 is insigni￿cant and interest rates tend to react very little to
the output gap in either the linear or asymmetric/non-linear model.
The results for the US reveal that the interest rate reaction function is
convex in in￿ation. As explained in section 2.4, this type of convexity does
not suﬃce to determine whether this is due to the presence of a precaution-
ary demand for expansions on the part of the Fed, or to a precautionary
demand for relatively low in￿ation rates (4% or below). Given that there is
no signi￿cant asymmetry in the output term it is not possible to discriminate
between the two views.
In the case of the UK, however, the interest rate reaction function is con-
vex in both in￿ation and the output gap (both β2 and γ2 are signi￿cantly
diﬀerent from zero). The convexity in the output gap implies that monetary
authorities in the the UK raised interest rates more aggressively during ex-
pansions than they reduced them during recessions. Given the theoretical
21framework in section 2 this ￿nding suggests that the precautionary demand
for low in￿ation dominated the behavior of policymakers in the UK. As we
shall see below, this is true also for the latter part of the sample. Despite the
persistence of in￿ation and the existence of diﬀerent institutional regimes in
the UK since 1979, these ￿ndings suggest that the majority of the period
(1979-97) involved the political authorities in struggling to build up an anti-
in￿ationary reputation in spite of the fact that monetary policy had not been
delegated to an independent central bank.
4 Estimates for a latter Sub-Sample
We examine next whether our results vary when we delete the ￿rst half of the
eighties from the sample. There is considerable evidence from empirical work
on linear interest rate reaction functions, that CB behavior has varied over
time (Muscatelli et al, (1999), Muscatelli and Trecroci (2000)). Interestingly
we ￿nd that, once we look at sub-sample estimates, an asymmetry on output
appears in the US.
Estimates of the HTSTR model for the sub-sample 1985-1999 are reported
in Table 4. All the non-linear output and in￿ation terms are now signi￿cant.
In the case of Japan and the UK the restrictions b β1 = b β2 and b γ1 = b γ2 are
now accepted by the data. This is not the case for the US, where instead we
a r ea b l et oi m p o s eb β1 = b β2 and b γ1 = −b γ2.
22Table 4: Sub-Sample GMM Estimates of Smooth-Transition
non-Linear Reaction Functions
Country Short-Run Coeﬃcients Statistics Sample
Period
b e α b β1




















































































Notes: Numbers in parenthesis indicate standard errors (using a consistent covariance
matrix for heteroscedasticity and serial correlation); σ indicates the standard error of the
estimate; J(n) is Hansen￿s test of the model￿s overidentifying restrictions, which is dis-
tributed as a χ2(n) variate under the null hypothesis of valid overidentifying restrictions.
T h es t a r st h a ta r ea t t a c h e di ns o m ec a s e st ot h es h o r tr u nc o e ﬃcients mean that those
coeﬃcients are signi￿cant at the 0.05 level of signi￿cance.
23Figure 2: Nonlinear Reaction Functions: USA 1985-2000
Figure 2 plots the resulting long run non linear reaction function for the
US. Although less prominent than in Figure 1, the convexity in in￿ation is
still present. But the main novel feature of Figure 2 is the emergence of an
output asymmetry, along the lines described in Section 2.5. The estimate of
γ2 is now negative and signi￿cant implying that the reaction function is a
concave function of the expected output gap. To be precise, positive values
of the output gap no longer lead to marked interest rate increases, whilst
negative values lead to substantial cuts. In terms of our theoretical model
(see equation (14)) this concave shape is consistent with the view that, after
having brought in￿ation under control, the US Fed developed a precaution-
ary demand for expansions.25 It seems that, following the credibility-building













where Fx(xt,1) ≡ tanh(ψx). Simulations reveal that, for ψ =0 .25 (which is the value of
this parameter that is chosen by the grid search), the expression in brackets is positive
for almost all the values of the output gap in our sample. Hence the reaction function is
24period of the early 1980s, the Fed became relatively more sensitive to reces-
sions.
To examine whether this is a common feature across countries, we plot
similar graphs for Japan and the UK in Figures 3 and 4 respectively (this
time only plotting the nonlinear reaction function to make the graphs clear).
In the case of Japan the post-1985 period has brought with it lower interest
rates, and a more salient asymmetry on in￿ation. The estimate of β2 is
now signi￿cant supporting the existence of some asymmetry in objectives.
The fact that the reaction function is now signi￿cantly convex in the output
gap (γ2 is positive and signi￿cant) supports the view that the dominant
asymmetry in Japanese monetary policy, in the post 1985 period, is the
precautionary demand for low in￿ation.
Unlike the US, the period since 1985 in the UK has been dominated by
further reputation building (and since 1992 the adoption of in￿ation target-
ing, leading to CB independence in 1997). As is apparent from the short run
coeﬃcients in Table 4 the reaction of the interest rate to the output gap has
a convex shape which is consistent (see equation (14)) with the existence of
a dominant precautionary demand for low in￿ation.
Unfortunately it is not possible to establish, given the few data points at
our disposal, whether UK behavior has changed since 1997. Estimating the
model from 1992 as opposed to 1985 yields very similar results, with an inter-
est rate reaction to the output gap which is convex. This re-enforces the view
that during periods of reputation building (or disin￿ation), the precautionary
demand for expansions becomes relatively less important, whilst once in￿a-
tion has been under control for some time (the US since the mid-1980s), the
precautionary demand for expansions dominates the precautionary demand
for low in￿ation.
These ￿ndings lend support to the notion that policymakers try harder to
avoid the retrospective policy mistakes which were most in evidence during
the immediately preceding periods. Monetary policymakers seem to change
their behavior over time in response to changing prevailing circumstances.
They are likely to place greater weight on the most imminent risk of loss. At
times of reputation building (like the UK in the nineties and the US in the
early 1980s) in￿ation seems to be the number one priority, and output loss
becomes relatively less important. Conversely during periods that are not
characterized by credibility-building and disin￿ation (e.g. the USA in the
c o n c a v ei nt h eo u t p u tg a pi fa n do n l yi fγ2 is negative, as is the case in the US after 1985.
25Figure 3: Nonlinear Reaction Function for Japan 1985-2000
Figure 4: Nonlinear Reaction Function for UK, 1985-2000
26post-1985 period), asymmetric preferences with respect to the output gap
re-emerge, creating the potential for an in￿ation bias.26
5 Conclusions
At the theoretical level this paper shows how asymmetries in the monetary
authority￿s objective function translate into non-linearities in interest rate
reaction functions when the structure of the economy is characterized by a
New - Keynesian transmission mechanism. At the empirical level the paper
shows that there is empirical support for such non-linearities and asymme-
tries. This is done by estimating interest rate reaction functions, which allow
for non linearities, for a number of G7 economies (the USA, Japan, Germany,
and the UK). For all countries except Germany, there is some evidence of
asymmetric behavior.
Of course, parameters of interest rate reaction functions are convolutions
of preference parameters and of structural parameters of the economy. The
theoretical framework implies that the existence of precautionary demands
for both expansions and low in￿ation lead to reaction functions that are con-
v e xi ne x p e c t e di n ￿ation. When the precautionary demand for expansions
dominates the conduct of monetary policy the reaction function is concave
in the expected output gap. When the precautionary demand for low in￿a-
tion dominates, the reaction function is convex in the expected output gap.
Thus the nature of non linearity with respect to the expected output gap is
i n f o r m a t i v ea b o u tt h ed o m i n a n tt y p eo fa s y m m e t r yi no b j e c t i v e s .
Using estimates for both the full sample period (1980 - 2000) and a latter
sub - period (1985 - 2000), we ￿nd that the output asymmetries in the inter-
est rate reaction function vary between countries and even within countries
between diﬀerent periods. For instance, it appears that where credibility-
building and disin￿ation has already been achieved (e.g. the USA after 1985),
the monetary authorities develop a greater precautionary demand for output
expansions than for low in￿ation. Conversely, where credibility-building is
26As shown in the theory section larger losses from negative, than from positive, output
gaps are consistent with the existence of a precautionary demand for expansions on the
part of monetary authorities. Cukierman (2000) and Ruge-Murcia (2001) show, for a Lucas
type supply function, that the existence of such a demand creates an in￿a t i o nb i a se v e ni f
policymakers target the natural level of output on average. Section 5 in Cukierman (2002)
shows that a similar result carries over to economies characterized by New - Keynesian
transmission mechanisms as well.
27still a concern for the authorities (e.g. the UK over the eighties and part
of the nineties), managing the business cycle for the monetary authorities is
dominated by concerns to keep in￿ation expectations low.
The variation over time in the behavior of monetary authorities is some-
times attributed to institutional change. But as shifts in the behavior of the
monetary authorities can also be detected in countries like the USA where
the institutional structure has remained relatively stable, one could interpret
shifts in behavior to the notion of ￿framing￿, i.e. that the monetary author-
ities will attach greater weight to the most immediate prospect of loss. In
particular, the empirical ￿ndings are consistent with the view that mone-
tary authorities develop a stronger aversion to the losses that were mostly in
evidence during the preceding several years.
A key conclusion which also emerges from the presence of asymmetries,
and the precautionary demand for expansions (see Cukierman, 2002), is that
a new source of in￿ationary bias can emerge. Unlike the traditional Kydland-
Prescott-Barro-Gordon in￿ation bias, the monetary authorities end up gener-
ating an in￿ation bias not because they are targeting a level of output which
is too high, but because they are perceived by the private sector to react less
aggressively to output expansions than to output contractions. Hence this
precautionary demand for expansions may generate a resurgence in in￿ation
expectations. It could well be that the ￿death of in￿ation￿ has been somewhat
e x a g g e r a t e di nt h el i t e r a t u r eo ni n ￿ation targets.
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317 Data Appendix
Time Series GDP for x (Potential
GDP) for x
π i

























Note: x is de￿ned as the output gap as a percentage of potential output;
potential output data is 6-monthly and interpolated to obtain quarterly data.
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